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Abstract  
This paper examines the cues that typically differentiate phishing emails from genuine emails. The 
research is conducted in two stages. In the first stage, we identify the cues that actually differentiate 
between phishing and genuine emails. These are the consistency and personalisation of the message, 
the perceived legitimacy of links and sender, and the presence of spelling or grammatical irregularities. 
In the second stage, we identify the cues that participants use to differentiate between phishing and 
genuine emails. This revealed that participants often use cues that are not good indicators of whether 
an email is phishing or genuine. This includes the presence of legal disclaimers, the quality of visual 
presentation, and the positive consequences emphasised in the email. This study has implications for 
education and training and provides a basis for the design and development of targeted and more 
relevant training and risk communication strategies. 
Keywords  
phishing, cyber security, human factors, decision making, cyber threat 
1 Introduction  
Phishing is a term used to describe the attempt to acquire sensitive or personal information, typically 
by sending an email in which the sender acts as a trustworthy entity. Despite the fact that security 
researchers and practitioners have been aware of the dangers associated with phishing for almost a 
decade, it still poses a significant problem today (Furnell 2013), and current technical phishing 
countermeasures are unable to prevent vulnerable users from being deceived (Purkait 2012).   
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Previous phishing studies have taken various forms and have measured participants’ responses to 
phishing emails in different ways. Some phishing studies have been conducted ‘in-the-wild’, where 
uninformed students received emails that claimed to be from their university. These studies have 
shown that susceptibility is high, particularly when students were influenced by authority or social 
context (Ferguson 2005; Jagatic et al. 2007). This approach has also been used within Small and 
Medium Enterprises and Multi-national Corporations to test their employees (Osterman Research Inc. 
2015). Other studies have required participants to make judgements concerning the authenticity of 
emails or websites, and have shown that many participants have trouble identifying phishing (Dhamija 
et al. 2006; Furnell 2007; Pattinson et al. 2012). Some of these studies have included qualitative data 
on the cues of an email that influenced participants; generally speaking, people are more likely to trust 
emails that are visually appealing, without language errors, and without excessive urgency (Furnell 
2007; Jakobsson et al. 2007; Parsons et al. 2013). Users often ignore standard security indicators 
(Dhamija et al. 2006).  
Although the results from previous research suggest that participants often make legitimacy decisions 
based on the presence of a variety of cues within emails, there has been no rigorous evaluation of 
which cues are more common in phishing emails and which cues can differentiate between phishing 
and genuine emails. Some studies (e.g., Olivo et al. 2013) have described the technical features of 
phishing emails, which usually involve aspects of the email header and URL, but these studies have not 
examined which email features are clues to identifying a phishing email. Research of this nature could 
identify which cues are good but poorly understood predictors of phishing. As a consequence, this 
could then form the basis of phishing education and training. Phishing education has received 
relatively little research attention (Arachchilage et al. 2013; Arachchilage et al. 2014; Purkait 2012).  
1.1 Aim of the research  
The current study seeks to determine if the cues that participants use to decide on the legitimacy of an 
email are good indicators of whether an email is phishing or genuine. The structure of this paper is as 
follows. The next section outlines previous research, including studies involving the categorisation of 
email cues in Section 2.1, and studies involving the cues identified by participants in previous studies 
in Section 2.2. This is followed by an explanation of Stage One of our research, in which we determine 
the cues that can actually differentiate between phishing and genuine emails, then Stage Two of our 
research, in which we determine the cues that participants used to differentiate between phishing and 
genuine emails. Finally, the significance and real-world implications of these findings are discussed, 
and conclusions presented.  
2 Previous Research  
2.1 Categorisation of email cues 
Our review of previous research identified very few studies that attempted to categorise the different 
cues of emails. Kim et al. (2013) attempted to understand the persuasive cues in phishing emails by 
categorising 285 phishing emails based on message presentation and content. This included aspects of 
source credibility, such as the sender’s email address, contact methods and company logo, and aspects 
of argument quality, such as the inclusion of rational, emotional and motivational appeals, as well as 
time pressure. They concluded that most phishing emails include rational, emotional or motivational 
appeals, but many do not include contact methods for the sender (Kim et al. 2013). 
Similarly, Blythe et al. (2011) collected 100 emails from a phishing archive and conducted a content 
analysis on the purported sender and premise of the email, the presence of logos, and the number of 
spelling and grammatical mistakes. They concluded that many phishing emails use convincing 
company logos and do not contain spelling mistakes, such that those cues could not be relied on to 
identify a phishing attack.  
Neither of these studies assessed whether these email cues are more or less likely to occur in genuine 
emails. Since users need to differentiate between phishing and genuine emails, it is vital to assess the 
cues of both, rather than focusing solely on phishing emails. These previous studies were also limited 
to the categorisation of email cues, and did not attempt to use this information to empirically 
determine which aspects of an email participants use to make legitimacy decisions. Our study attempts 
to address these issues. 
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2.2 Email cues identified by participants in previous studies 
As highlighted in Section 1, a number of previous phishing studies have collected qualitative data on 
the email cues that participants used to make their legitimacy decisions.  
For example, when Jakobsson (2007) asked participants to identify deceptive elements of phishing 
emails, the most important aspects they noted were spelling, grammar and design, followed by the 
source of the message, which included the link and reply-to address. Participants were more likely to 
trust emails with copyright information or legal disclaimers, but too much emphasis on security 
tended to decrease a participant’s trust in an email (Jakobsson et al. 2007). In Furnell’s (2007) study, 
participants were most influenced by visual factors (such as logos, banners, and copyright 
information), technical cues (such as the URL and use of ‘https’), and language and content aspects 
(such as spelling mistakes, personalisation, and whether the message was overly urgent or forceful). 
Parsons et al. (2013) found that many participants were influenced by an inherent trust in the 
company from which the email appeared to originate. Other cues included visual presentation, spelling 
and grammatical errors, personalisation, and potential incentives within the email (Parsons et al., 
2013). Similarly, Egelman et al. (2008) also found that participants were influenced by an inherent 
trust in the purported company and by personalisation. It was also reported that when participants 
looked at the URL, they did not always make an accurate decision regarding its authenticity. Many 
participants trusted phishing emails enough to visit the URLs and, in fact, many then failed to heed the 
active security warnings in the subsequent website (Egelman et al. 2008).  
Complementary research (Fogg et al, 2003) has examined the cues of websites and asked participants 
to make comments about the credibility of each site. In this study, 46% of comments focused on the 
design and look of the website. Other comments included the structure and focus of information and 
the underlying motive of the website. Dhamija et al. (2006) found participants failed to utilise cues 
such as the address bar, status bar and security indicators, and were instead frequently influenced by 
visual presentation.  
However, these findings are all based on participants’ self-report of, rather than an empirical 
evaluation of, the cues that participants use to differentiate between phishing and genuine emails. In 
order to measure these factors empirically, it is first necessary to have a comprehensive understanding 
of the cues that can exist in phishing and real emails.  
3 Stage One: Identifying the Cues that Differentiate Between 
Phishing and Genuine Emails  
3.1 Stage One: Methodology  
We used the findings reported in Section 2.2 to develop a list of cues that were commonly used to 
differentiate between phishing and genuine emails. The aim was to develop a list of cues that could be 
used to judge both types of emails. Any cue that was judged as important in any of the reviewed 
publications was added to the list. Content analysis was then used to group cues that fit in the same 
category. This resulted in 13 cues, which are listed in Table 1, together with the associated publications 
and the authors’ description of the cues. 
 
Cue Description used by authors Source publication 
Consistency Structure and focus of information  (Fogg et al., 2003) 
Links  Source of the message: link  
Technical cues: URL 
Technical cues: https 
URL 
Address bar 
(Jakobsson, 2007) 
(Furnell, 2007) 
(Furnell, 2007) 
(Egelman et al., 2008) 
(Dhamija et al., 2006) 
Visual 
presentation 
Logo 
Logo 
Design 
Visual factors: logos  
Visual factors: banners 
Visual factors: copyright information 
(Kim & Kim, 2013) 
(Blythe et al., 2011) 
(Jakobsson, 2007) 
(Furnell, 2007) 
(Furnell, 2007) 
(Furnell, 2007) 
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Visual presentation  
Design and look 
Visual presentation  
(Parsons et al., 2013) 
(Fogg et al., 2003) 
(Dhamija et al., 2006) 
Personalisation Language and content aspects: personalisation 
Personalisation 
Personalisation 
(Furnell, 2007) 
(Parsons et al., 2013) 
(Egelman et al., 2008) 
Spelling and 
grammatical 
errors 
Spelling and grammar 
Spelling and grammar 
Language and content aspects: spelling mistakes 
Spelling and grammatical errors 
(Blythe et al., 2011) 
(Jakobsson, 2007) 
(Furnell, 2007) 
(Parsons et al., 2013) 
Security  
 
Status bar 
Security indicators 
Security 
(Dhamija et al., 2006) 
(Dhamija et al., 2006) 
(Jakobsson et al., 2007) 
Legal  Copyright information or legal disclaimers (Jakobsson et al., 2007) 
Sender Sender’s address 
Contact methods 
Purported sender 
Source of the message: reply-to address 
(Kim & Kim, 2013) 
(Kim & Kim, 2013) 
(Blythe et al., 2011) 
(Jakobsson, 2007) 
Familiarity Source credibility 
Trust in purported company 
Inherent trust in company 
(Kim & Kim, 2013) 
(Parsons et al., 2013) 
(Egelman et al., 2008) 
Importance Rational appeals (Kim & Kim, 2013) 
Urgency 
 
Time pressure 
Language & content aspects: overly urgent or forceful 
(Kim & Kim, 2013) 
(Furnell, 2007) 
Positive 
consequences 
Potential incentives  
Emotional appeals  
Motivational appeals 
Premise of the email  
Underlying motive of the website  
(Parsons et al., 2013) 
(Kim & Kim, 2013) 
(Kim & Kim, 2013) 
(Blythe et al., 2011) 
(Fogg et al., 2003) 
Negative 
consequences 
Emotional appeals  
Motivational appeals 
Premise of the email  
Underlying motive of the website  
(Kim & Kim, 2013) 
(Kim & Kim, 2013) 
(Blythe et al., 2011) 
(Fogg et al., 2003) 
Table 1: Email cues identified in previous research 
 
Using the 50 emails presented in Parsons et al. (2013), five participants rated each email on the 
presence or absence of the 13 cues listed in Table 1. These emails comprised 25 phishing and 25 
genuine emails, and included emails from a range of topics, including banking, shopping and social 
networking emails. All participants had post-graduate qualifications; four were registered 
psychologists and one had a PhD in information security. They all have knowledge and skill in the 
topic and can therefore be considered ‘Experts’. For each cue, an explanatory statement was 
developed. For the first 11 of the cues, experts were asked to respond to the following statements on a 
five-point scale from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’:   
 
Consistency: “The message within this email is consistent” 
Links: “The links within this email are legitimate” 
Visual presentation: “The visual presentation of this email makes it appear legitimate” 
Personalisation: “This email is personalised to the recipient” 
Spelling: “This email has spelling and / or grammatical irregularities” 
Security: “This email contains security advice” 
Legal: “The email contains copyright information and legal disclaimers” 
Sender: “The email appears to be from the claimed sender” 
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Familiarity: “I am familiar with the named organisation or company” 
Important: “This email is important” 
Urgency: “This email is urgent”   
Experts were also asked to rate the final two cues in regards to the possible positive consequences (e.g., 
gain) or negative consequences (e.g., threat) specified within each email. They could respond with 
‘N/A’, ‘Unclear / Not Sure’, ‘Low’ or ‘High’. For each cue, experts were provided with a definition to 
ensure they had a consistent understanding of the cue. For example, the following definitions were 
provided for consistency, visual presentation and email importance, respectively: 
 “This refers to whether the email has a conflicting or stable message throughout” 
 “This refers to whether the email has a professional design, and should take into account 
whether the logos, colour schemes and other imagery seems consistent with the claimed 
sender” 
 “This refers to the importance of the email, and should take into account whether the email 
could be of significance or value to the recipient” 
3.2 Stage One: Results  
To determine the agreement between the ratings, participants’ responses were assigned a numerical 
value (e.g., Strongly disagree = 1, Strongly agree = 5) and the inter-rater reliability was analysed using 
a two-way mixed, consistency, average-measures intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) (McGraw et 
al. 1996; Shrout et al. 1979). Based on Cicchetti’s (1994) guidelines, the resulting ICC was in the 
excellent range (ICC = .918, CI 95% = [.908, .927]), indicating a high degree of reliability between 
experts. Given this high degree of reliability, an average score was deemed to be suitable for use in 
further analysis.  
To determine which of the cues rated by experts could be used to distinguish between phishing and 
genuine emails, a series of independent samples t-tests were conducted. This analysis determines 
whether any of the cues were significantly more likely to occur in either phishing or genuine emails. 
This analysis requires non-orthogonal planned comparisons, which means the comparisons of interest 
are not independent. To reduce the probability of Type 1 error caused by these 13 comparisons, the 
significance level () was adjusted to .004 using the Bonferroni technique (Dunn 1961). This approach 
ensures the family-wise alpha level remains at .05, and therefore also minimises the risk of Type 2 
error. The results for phishing and genuine emails for all rated cues are displayed in Table 2.  
 
 Type of email  
 Phishing Genuine t-test 
Cues M (SD) M (SD) t df p value 
Consistency 4.08 (0.56) 4.54 (0.39) -3.427 48 .001* 
Links 2.01 (0.64) 4.16 (0.46) -13.311 41.85 .000* 
Visual presentation 3.49 (1.04) 3.90 (0.91) -1.476 48 .147 
Personalisation 1.47 (0.79) 3.18 (1.30) -5.629 39.67 .000* 
Spelling 2.35 (1.03) 1.62 (0.60) 3.042 38.67 .004* 
Security 1.87 (0.71) 2.14 (1.05) -1.042 48 .303 
Legal 2.50 (1.31) 2.50 (1.31) -0.022 48 .983 
Sender 3.07 (0.98) 4.40 (0.50) -6.037 35.88 .000* 
Familiarity 3.92 (0.98) 3.93 (1.06) -.028 48 .978 
Importance 2.38 (0.41) 2.82 (0.77) -2.522 36.84 .016 
Urgency 2.98 (0.76) 2.44 (0.71) 2.614 48 .012 
Positive consequences 1.49 (0.55) 1.18 (0.58) 1.943 48 .058 
Negative consequences 1.24 (0.83) 0.70 (0.57) 2.702 42.28 .010 
* p < .004 
Table 2: Independent samples t-test for expert ratings of emails 
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Results in Table 2 reveal that genuine emails were significantly more likely to be rated as consistent 
and personalised. Genuine emails were also significantly more likely than the phishing emails to have 
links and a purported sender that were rated to be legitimate. Phishing emails, on the other hand, were 
significantly more likely to contain spelling and grammatical irregularities. 
The comparisons associated with positive and negative consequences, importance and urgency 
approached significance, but did not exceed the alpha level of interest ( = .004). There were no 
significant differences between genuine and phishing emails based on visual presentation, the 
familiarity of the purported organisation, or the security advice, copyright information or legal 
disclaimers within the email. Hence, cues such as the visual presentation of the email, familiarity of 
the named organisation, and the security advice, copyright information or legal disclaimers within the 
email could not be used to differentiate between phishing and genuine emails.  
4 Stage Two: Identifying the Cues that Participants Use 
4.1 Stage Two: Methodology  
To determine which of the email cues participants used to differentiate between phishing and genuine 
emails, the original data in Parsons et al.’s (2013) study was re-examined using the ratings reported in 
Section 3.2. In Parsons et al. (2013), 59 university students participated in a lab-based, role-play 
experiment and were asked to manage 50 emails1, with all participants being asked to respond to the 
question, “How would you manage this email?” with one of the four replies:  
a) leave the email in the inbox and flag for follow up;  
b) leave the email in the inbox;  
c) delete the email;  
d) delete the email and block the sender.  
For the purposes of the following analysis, a genuine email was deemed to be correctly managed if 
participants responded with options (a) or (b), and a phishing email was deemed to be correctly 
managed if participants responded with options (c) or (d). Although this scoring system may not 
always reflect participants’ decisions on the legitimacy of an email, the validity of this approach for 
representing participants’ intentions is demonstrated in Parsons et al. (2014).  
The expert ratings were also converted to a binary score, so each cue was either ‘present’ or ‘absent’ in 
each email. For the cues assessed on a scale from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’, the cue was 
deemed to be ‘present’ if the experts’ consensus score was either ‘Agree’ or ‘Strongly Agree’, and 
‘absent’ for all other response options (i.e., ‘Strongly Disagree’, ‘Disagree’ and ‘Neither Agree Not 
Disagree’). For the other scale types, a cue was deemed to be ‘present’ if the consensus score was ‘Low’ 
or ‘High’, and ‘absent’ for all other response options (i.e., ‘N/A’ and ‘Unclear / Not Sure’).   
After rescoring, 2 of the 13 cues were excluded from further analysis. Consistency was removed as only 
2 of the 50 emails were judged to be inconsistent, and similarly, Security was removed as only 5 of the 
50 emails were judged to contain security advice.  
4.2 Stage Two: Results  
For each participant, accuracy scores were calculated for both the presence and absence of each cue, 
where accuracy is the ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. These scores 
determine whether participants’ performance was influenced by any of the cues. A large difference in 
performance when a cue was present versus absent indicates that the cue may have been a 
determinant in participants’ decision making. For example, one participant had an accuracy of only 
17% for the emails where visual presentation was judged to be absent, and an accuracy of 61% for the 
emails where visual presentation was judged to be present. This suggests that this participant’s 
performance was influenced by the visual presentation of an email; they tended to make good 
decisions for emails that had high visual appeal, and poor decisions for the emails without a 
professional design or colours and logos.  
                                                        
1
 These participants were not specifically told that they were taking part in a phishing study. A further 58 
participants completed the same experiment and were primed to the phishing aspect of the study. Since the non-
primed participants better represent the real world (where people are infrequently reminded of the risks of 
phishing) the data from these non-primed participants are re-examined in this study. 
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To evaluate the impact of the presence or absence of each cue on participants’ performance, a series of 
paired-sample t-tests were conducted. Since this analysis requires non-orthogonal comparisons, the 
alpha level was adjusted to .005 using the Bonferroni technique to account for 11 non-orthogonal tests.  
As shown in Table 3, these results indicate that several cues significantly influenced performance. 
Participants were significantly more likely to correctly manage an email when visual presentation was 
professional and when the email was personalised and important. They were also more accurate at 
judging emails that did not have spelling and grammatical errors or legal disclaimers, and 
discrimination performance was worse when emails had urgency or positive consequences. 
Participants were least likely to correctly manage emails that were urgent, with overall accuracy of only 
42% for these emails. Since the results in Section 4.2 revealed that visual presentation, legal 
disclaimers, importance and urgency could not differentiate between phishing and genuine emails, 
this may mean that participants used poor cues to make legitimacy decisions.  
  
 Occurrence of cue   
 Absent Present t-test 
Cues M (SD) M (SD) t df p value 
Links 0.46 (0.21) 0.58 (0.20) -2.50 58 .015 
Visual presentation 0.44 (0.17) 0.54 (0.09) -4.83 58 .000* 
Personalisation 0.44 (0.14) 0.67 (0.17) -6.93 58 .000* 
Spelling 0.55 (0.10) 0.43 (0.17) 4.99 58 .000* 
Legal 0.55 (0.10) 0.45 (0.12) 6.67 58 .000* 
Sender 0.50 (0.22) 0.52 (0.22) -.49 58 .623 
Familiarity 0.51 (0.14) 0.52 (0.10) -.07 58 .941 
Importance 0.46 (0.11) 0.75 (0.16) -11.37 58 .000* 
Urgency 0.55 (0.09) 0.42 (0.16) 6.74 58 .000* 
Positive consequences 0.55 (0.13) 0.50 (0.09) 3.03 58 .004* 
Negative consequences 0.53 (0.10) 0.49 (0.16) 1.65 58 .104 
Table 3: Paired samples t-test for proportion correct based on email cues 
5 Discussion  
This study presented a detailed categorisation of the cues of 25 phishing and 25 genuine emails. Based 
on the judgements of five experts, findings suggest that consistency, links, personalisation, spelling 
and the sender are the best indicators of the genuineness of an email. Generally speaking, genuine 
emails are more likely to have a stable message throughout, more likely to have links that appeared 
legitimate, more likely to be addressed to the recipient, are less likely to have spelling or grammatical 
errors, and are more likely to be from a sender who appeared legitimate.  
Our results demonstrated that participants often make decisions based on poor indicators of the 
genuineness of an email. For example, participants were influenced by visual presentation; they 
tended to make more accurate decisions when faced with emails with a professional looking design or 
logo, but poor decisions for emails with poor visual presentation.  
Results also indicated that participants were influenced by the urgency of an email. The lowest 
performance for any category occurred when participants judged emails that were rated as urgent by 
the experts. This is particularly concerning from a practical point of view. Essentially, evidence 
suggests that the average phishing site is taken down after approximately 62 hours (Hong 2012), which 
means phishing emails require victims to make a quick decision. From a practical point of view, users 
who are influenced by urgency are more likely to be phished. Hence, this study highlights a need to 
educate participants on the dangers associated with a quick or urgent response to phishing emails.  
This study has implications for education and training and provides a basis for the design and 
development of targeted and more relevant training and risk communication strategies. It indicates 
which cues were the best indicators of a genuine email, and also which cues influenced participants. 
This highlights the areas where education should be focused to change behaviour. For example, 
participants were significantly more accurate when viewing emails without legal disclaimers. This 
means the presence of copyright information or legal disclaimers degraded a participant’s ability to 
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accurately assess an email. Training and education should emphasise that certain cues, such as a legal 
disclaimer, can be copied by people with malicious intentions, and are therefore poor indicators of an 
email’s legitimacy. Similarly, training and education could highlight the ease with which an email can 
be created to have a high visual representation due to the ready access of corporate logos etc. via 
electronic means. Furthermore, although certain cues are good indicators of an email’s legitimacy, 
education should emphasise that these cues are indicative and not absolute or infallible. For example, 
it is common to find poor spelling or grammar in genuine emails, and not all phishing emails contain 
mistakes. In addition, since scammers continually improve the sophistication of phishing emails 
(Arachchilage et al. 2013; Arachchilage et al. 2014; Purkait 2012), it is important that any training is 
regularly updated to reflect current trends.  
These findings also have important implications for marketing and business. Companies who want to 
ensure their clients or customers will trust their emails should use quality visual presentation and 
should not emphasise the urgency or positive consequences associated with their email. Instead, they 
should use personalisation and should emphasise the importance of the email.   
5.1 Limitations and Future Directions  
This study used a selection of actual phishing and genuine emails such that the effect of the cues in 
emails was not controlled. Hence, in each email, a number of different cues occurred simultaneously, 
and some cues did not occur with equal frequency for phishing and genuine emails. For example, of 
the 17 emails that were judged to be ‘personalised’, only 2 were phishing emails. In contrast, 23 
phishing emails and 10 genuine emails were not personalised. Hence, correctly managing emails 
without personalisation was a more difficult task than managing personalised emails. Consequently, 
the results of this study do not reveal the influence of a single cue on participants’ performance. In a 
future study, the presence or absence of each cue could be more strictly controlled.  
It is also important to note that participants were not required to act; the options only required them 
to identify how they would act. Although previous research has proven that the categories utilised 
provide a reasonable representation of the intentions of participants (Parsons et al., 2014), results are 
solely based on a lab-based, role-play experiment. It is also important to note that the role-play 
experiment limits participants’ ability to make context dependent decisions. For example, participants 
did not know whether the recipient subscribes to a particular bank or social networking site. Ideally 
future research could obtain permission and ethics approval to monitor how individuals make 
decisions for emails received in their own inboxes to better understand which aspects of an email are 
most influential. 
In addition, future research could calculate the presence or absence of cues using non-binary criteria. 
This may reveal whether participants’ performance varied based on the level at which each cue was 
present. Future research could also replicate this study using a larger number of experts. This could 
verify whether the cues identified by the five experts used in this study reflect those identified by a 
larger expert group. Finally, the cues judged by experts in this research were based on the cues 
identified in previous research, and few of these were based on the social engineering techniques that 
may compel an individual to respond. Future research could assess the influence of social engineering 
techniques like authority or social influence to determine which of these most influence different types 
of individuals.  
6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the research of this paper expands on the largely speculative nature of research 
regarding the cues that participants use to differentiate between a phishing and genuine email. It was 
found that compared to genuine emails, phishing emails are more likely than genuine emails to have 
spelling or grammatical errors and are less likely than genuine emails to be personalised, consistent, 
and less likely to have links and a sender that appears legitimate. This information could form the 
basis of phishing training and education.  
This paper also revealed that participants’ legitimacy decisions are often influenced by incorrect cues. 
For example, participants were influenced by more extraneous aspects of an email, such as visual 
presentation and the positive consequences in the email. This suggests that people require further 
training and education on the aspects of an email that are the best indicators of the genuineness of an 
email. However, since phishing emails are becoming increasingly sophisticated, it is important that 
researchers and organisations do not become complacent, and instead, regularly review the cues of 
both phishing and genuine emails, and the cues that influence user performance, to assist users to 
make their decisions based on the most useful information. 
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